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I. Introduction 
 
During the recent turmoil in world financial market and its cascading disruptive effects, 
the  role  of  financial  integration  assumes  importance.  A  common  outshoot  of  such 
financial  crises  generated  locally  or  regionally  is  that  they  spread  faster  to  other 
connected markets and economies to the extent such markets and countries are integrated 
with the originator country. The emerging/developing/non-developed countries bear their 
share of the brunt mostly due to their dependence on the advanced economies by way of 
trade or financial partnerships. There exists the famous adage: “If the US sneezes, rest of 
the world catches pneumonia.” As of late, the severity of this phenomenon might have 
been  reduced  –  owing  largely  to  emergence  of  alternate  economic  powers  that  are 
characterized by high rate of sustained growth – and also to what economists call the 
“De-Coupling  Effect”  –  that  some  of  these  economies  have  been  able  to  insulate 
themselves from shockwaves in other countries in such a way that susceptibility to such 
external disruptions has lessened, the domestic balance remaining largely unaltered.  
However, in the age of increasing global integration, growing countries can not afford to 
stay highly insulated, closed or de-coupled from other economies. To accelerate such 
integration, countries resort to various approaches, financial integration being a prime 
one among them. And financial integration presupposes capital account liberalization. At 
one end of the spectrum is fully restricted capital account; at the other, a fully convertible 
capital account. Many of the developed countries practice the later. The least developed 
countries have a too low extent of capital account liberalization. The emerging countries 
largely fall midway – they have partially open and liberalized capital account.  
Among the emerging economies, India occupies a dominant space. According to IMF and 
other  reports,  India  would  come  in  the  top  three  of  the  economically  most  powerful 
economies  by  2050.  It  has  a  much  higher  growth  rate  (more  than  8%  per  annum) 
compared to many developed countries. 
This paper examines the status of readiness of India in adopting a fully convertible capital 
account, keeping in mind its present and future financial integration status and objectives. 
Section  I briefly introduces the scope  and objective of the paper.  Section II  explains 
financial  integration  in  terms  of  its  meaning,  forms  and  preconditions.  Section  III 
introduces Capital Account Convertibility (CAC) and its dimensions with a short note on 
the role of CAC in Asian currency crises in 1997-98. Section IV links CAC with financial 
integration. Section V describes the present state of financial integration in India. Section 
VI explores CAC in Indian context in greater detail. Section VII examines to what extent 
India is ready to adopt full CAC, going by the current state and the issues of concern, and 
concludes the paper. 
 
II: Financial Integration 
 
II.A. Financial Integration: What It Means 
The commonly  accepted definition of  Financial Integration 
[1] states that all potential 
participants in a market: 
·  Are subject to a single set of rules when dealing with financial products and/or 
services. 
·  Have equal access to this specific set of financial instruments/services. 
·  Are treated equally when they operate in the market. 
   5 
The above definition of financial integration has three important features. 
·  Financial  integration  is  independent  of  the  financial  structures  within  regions 
(financial structure encompasses all financial intermediaries (institutions/market) 
and how they relate to one another with respect to flow of funds to and from 
households, government and corporations). 
·  Frictions  in  the  process  of  intermediation  can  persist  even  after  financial 
integration  is  completed.  Even  with  existing  friction,  many  areas  can  be 
financially integrated as long as such friction affects these areas symmetrically. 
·  This  definition  of  financial  integration  separates  the  two  constituents  of  a 
financial market, i.e. the Supply of, and Demand for, investment opportunities. 
 
II.B. Forms of Financial Integration 
 
Financial integration can assume three primary forms 
[2]. 
·  Direct Financial (Capital Market) Integration 
This form is expressed in terms of deviation from LOOP (Law of One Price) for 
financial securities. Under perfect direct financial integration, an investor can expect 
the same ROI (Return on Investment) on different markets, and borrowers the same 
loan costs, after the required adjustment has been made for risk (If the differential in 
expected risk-adjusted return is greater than zero but less than or equal to one, the 
markets are efficient but disintegrated). 
·  Indirect Financial Integration  
In  such  form,  the  ROI  for  one  economy  is  indirectly  linked  to  the  ROI  in  other 
economies. Here, influence on one market is exerted indirectly by other markets – the 
capital  market  can  become  (dis)integrated  through the  (indirect)  influences  of the 
goods market and the forex market. 
·  Total Financial Integration 
It  encompasses  both  the  Direct  and  Indirect  forms.  Perfect  or  total  financial 
integration implies that real exchange rates are the same across all concerned markets. 
Perfect total financial integration presupposes perfect indirect integration. If perfect 
total integration is complete at a global level, the world would consist of a single 
financial  market  comprising  perfectly  linked  national  capital  markets  under  strict 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
Alternately, we can classify financial integration into two forms (USAID, 1998): 
·  Horizontal Integration:  
      This relates to the interlinking among domestic financial market segments. 
·  Vertical integration:  
      This refers to integration between domestic market and regional or international 




[1] “Measuring Financial Integration in the Euro Area”, Occasional Paper Series (No. 14, 
April 2004), European Central Bank, by Baele, Ferrando, Hordahl, Krylova and Monnet 
 
[2] “International Financial Integration”, Lars Oxelheim, pp. 4 
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II.C. Drivers of Financial Integration 
 
Financial integration at a global level is driven by the following key factors: 
·  Opportunity to diversify risk internationally, since investors can access more than 
one  countries  as  investment  destination.  The  typical  “all-eggs-in-one-basket” 
justification is advocated. 
·  Higher Rate of Return 
In  developed  countries  the  growth  rates  have  slowed  down.  In  contrast  the 
emerging/developing economies show higher growth rates. Average rate of return is 
higher, too, in these economies.  Irrespective of the level of development, rational 
investors would always choose higher ROI/ROR over lower ones, and hence the more 
is the number of investment destinations, the better choice they have. 
·  Improved governance, compliance and regulations 
Increased  levels  of  integration  would  compel  the  host  countries  to  adopt  stricter 
regulation measures, compliance standards and improved governance at par with the 
international levels and standards.  
 
II.D. Determinants/Characteristics of Effective Financial Market Integration 
 
An integrated financial market is characterized by following traits: 
·  Financial markets are efficient (A market is called efficient if the rate prevailing 
at any point of time reflects all the existing information available in the market). 
·  Rates are market-determined. 
·  Rates of Return are related to some benchmark/reference rate (such as LIBOR). 
·  There is resource flow from one segment of the market to others. Thus arbitrage 
opportunities are ruled out. 
·  Rates of various financial market segments tend to move in tandem. 
  
 
III: Capital Account Convertibility (CAC) 
 
 
III.A. Capital Control and CAC 
 
Full Capital Account Convertibility (FCAC) implies that residents in a country can freely 
exchange  domestic  currency/financial  assets  against  foreign  currency/financial  assets, 
without any restrictions. A foreign currency transaction can be of two types: Current 
Account and Capital Account. While the former denotes transactions for normal trade 
and  some  specified  non-trade  purposes  (e.g.  medical  treatment,  education  expenses 
abroad), capital account transactions are only for investment purposes. 
Restricted CAC implies existence of capital control. This section discusses a few aspects 
of capital control per se. 
Capital controls can be imposed on: 
·  Direction of Capital flows (Inflows or Outflows) 
·  Type of capital Flows (FDI/FPI/Portfolio Debt or Equity) 
·  Maturity of capital flows (Short-term/Medium-term/Long-term) 
·  Sectoral destination of capital flows (Financial/Real estate/Infrastructure etc)    7 
In essence, capital controls include restrictions pertaining to: 
￿  Repatriation or surrender of proceeds from exports, invisibles and current 
transfers. 
￿  Purchase and sale of capital- or money-market instruments. 
￿  Derivatives or other instruments. 
￿  Outward or inward FDI or real estate transactions 
￿  Liquidation of direct investments 
￿  Provision for banks and financial institutions.  
Above instances of capital control can be categorized into three broad forms: 
·  Quantitative 
In this form, capital control is imposed in measurable quantitative formats, ranging 
from complete prohibition (100% control) to some liberalization subject to limits and 
ceilings. Generally such forms of control require explicit moratorium or stipulated 
limit on such transactions. 
·  Price-based 
This form of control seeks to introduce disincentives to discourage some categories of 
capital flows and/or incentives to encourage another category of capital flows. For 
example,  discriminatory  taxation  and  differential  interest  rates  may  be  used  to 
stimulate or dampen capital flows. Tobin Tax is an example of this form. 
A case in point is China. Being faced with huge capital inflows in early ‘90s, China 
imposed unremunerated compulsory reserve requirement of 20% on all short-term 
debt inflows in ’91. Later it imposed various Stay Requirements on FDI and FPI. 
Thus it succeeded in tilting the maturity structure of its debt inflows from short-term 
to long-term. 
In many cases, a mix of Quantitative and Price-Based controls are exercised. 
·  Regulatory. 
In addition to above, various regulatory forms of control could be imposed on the flows. 
In India most forms of control are quantitative, though in some cases, the second and the 
third form are exercised. 
It may be noted that controls are stricter in case of short-term rather long-term inflows. 
Also, capital inflows are easier to control than outflows.  
Capital controls do not come without costs. First, restrictive capital controls penalize 
short-term credit. In Chile, the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector was badly 
hit  due  to  imposition  of  capital  controls,  as  their  cost  of  capital  (COC)  increased 
substantially,  adding  more  burdens  towards  debt-servicing.  In  addition,  raising  new 
capital was stalled by most firms on account of higher COC. Second, capital control 
affects  total  economic  (allocative)  efficiency  by  favoring  existing  and/or  potential 
benefits  to  politically  connected  firms.  Third,  it  distorts  the  investment  decisions  of 
multinational companies. Fourth, capital controls, once imposed, can be irreversible over 
time. Once abolished, re-imposing them can generate causes for tension. Case in point is 
Malaysia. When the Asian crisis erupted in 1997-98, Malaysia by then had full CAC for 
almost 20 years, but considering the financial crises and its own coordinates, Malaysia 
decided  to  re-impose  some  forms  of  capital  control.  This  quickly  eroded  investor 
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III.B. Pre-conditions for CAC 
 
Before a country decides to adopt full capital account convertibility, it should ensure a 
general set of pre-conditions that precedes it. 
·  Macroeconomic policy concerns 
A sound policy framework ideally should promote growth: by keeping inflation low, 
the budget deficit small, and the Current Account Deficit (CAD) sustainable (CAD 
sustainability has two aspects: From the debt perspective, it depends on economy’s 
growth  rate  and  real  interest  rate.  Secondly,  this  sustainability  also  represents  the 
ability  to  absorb internal  and  external  shocks  –  though  that is less  susceptible  to 
measurement  or  formal  analysis.  CAD  financed  by  FDI  inflows  and  long-term 
borrowings is usually more sustainable, but financing CAD through short-term debt is 
a cause of concern. 
Short-term capital inflows in response to higher domestic interest rates are a cause of 
unease that many countries are facing of late. As a defense measure, flexibility of 
interest rate regime is necessary. Another measure could be an increasing flexibility 
of the exchange rate mechanism as well.  
·  Sound financial sector 
Importance of a strong domestic financial sector can not be over-emphasized, more so 
after the Asian experience in late nineties. By now it has become an established fact 
that the financial sector should have strong supervision and prudent standards, safe 
lending policies, low level of bad loans or Non-Performing Assets (NPA), adequate 
provision  for  reserves  to  ward  off  sudden  and  unexpected  contingencies,  and 
transparent financial reporting standards. 
·  Effective supervisory system 
There should exist an efficient and effective supervisory and regulatory authority to 
keep tag on the transparency and critical issues like capital adequacy in banks. 
 
III.C. CAC and Exchange Rate Regime: A Note 
  
This section inspects the role of exchange rate regime with respect to capital market 
integration and/or CAC. It begins with the well-known Trilemma of Impossible Trinity, 
which  says  it  is  impossible  to  achieve  the  following  three  goals  simultaneously: 
Exchange Rate Stability, Capital Market Integration and Monetary Autonomy. Any pair 
of goals is achievable by adopting a suitable payments regime abandoning the third. In 
particular, 
·  Exchange stability and capital market integration can be covered by adopting a 
fixed X-rate regime, but by giving up monetary authority. Thus the authorities 
lose the power of changing the domestic interest rate independently of foreign 
interest rate. 
·  Monetary autonomy can be combined with Capital market integration by giving 
up Exchange stability. Authorities can freely choose the domestic interest rate but 
must accept the market-dictated (floating) exchange rate. 
·  Exchange  stability  can  be  combined  with  Monetary  Autonomy  by  giving  up 
Capital  Market  integration  –  in  presence  of  capital  controls,  the  interest-
rate/exchange-rate link breaks. 
Accordingly, CAC – implying the absence of policy barriers to capital flows is consistent 
with imperfect capital mobility, since there can be natural barriers to mobility that can   9 
make domestic and foreign assets imperfect substitutes. It creates some scope for at least 
short-term intervention using sterilization and thus, some monetary autonomy may co-
exist with a fixed X-rate.  
On principle, there can be six alternative combinations of X-Rate regime and Capital 
Control: 
1. Fixed X-rate + CAC 
2. Floating X-rate + CAC 
3. Intermediate X-rate + CAC 
4. Fixed X-rate + Capital control 
5. Floating X-rate + Capital control 
6. Intermediate X-rate + Capital control. 
On inspection it can be realized that option (6) dominates options (4) and (5). However, 
exploration  of  these  options  in  details  is  out  of  scope  of  this  paper.  For  India,  the 
applicable options would be (3) and (6). 
Choice of appropriate X-Rate is critical in justifying long-run viability and desirability of 
CAC. Instead of adopting a rigidly fixed X-Rate, many countries have a “Managed Float” 
system  where,  even  though  the  domestic  currency  is  de-jure  fully  flexible  and  is 
“determined” by market demand and supply, the central bank intervenes at the right time 
to lessen any undesirable impacts of an appreciation or depreciation of domestic currency 
(primarily through Forex buying and selling) so that the deviation doesn’t extend beyond 
a certain band. This system is opted with the intention of keeping the X-rate within a 
targeted range.  
Another  wisely  adopted  system  is  the  Pegged  X-Rate  system  where  the  country  in 
question “Pegs” its domestic “Soft Currency” to another “Hard Currency” (such as US 
Dollar). The value of domestic currency fluctuates according to the direction of change in 
the value of the Hard Currency. However, a time-tested fallout of a pegged system is that 
if the domestic currency is kept deliberately overvalued for a prolonged period, the long-
run export-competitiveness gets adversely affected whereas imports become cheaper, so 
current account deficit starts to widen. After a threshold level such an economy becomes 
unviable. 
Since full CAC would result in increased forex flows in and out of the country, choice of 
X-rate  becomes  an  important  factor.  Effects  on  the  exchange  rate  would  depend 
importantly  on  how  well  the  country  manages  its  intervention  in  forex  market  and 
consequent  stabilization  of  X-Rate.  Central  Bank’s  buying  of  too  much  forex  using 
domestic  currency  would  result  in  inflationary  pressure;  this  can  be  avoided  using 
Sterilization. But sterilization too doesn’t come without costs, and thus beyond a limit 
becomes too much of a burden on domestic economy. 
 
III.D. Trade Openness and CAC 
 
Trade openness is indirectly linked to capital account convertibility. The exports/GDP 
ratio and the Imports/GDP ratio together determine the CAD/GDP ratio. A widening 
CAD is sustainable if and only if matched by sufficient forex reserves or capital inflows, 
or both. However, beyond a certain threshold level, it is not desirable to widen the CAD 
as it would have other economic consequences. 
For example, if capital inflows like FPI become an important source of financing CAD, a 
problem arises – the economy needs a higher rate of interest to attract such inflow, and 
also,  a  strong  exchange-rate  regime  is  needed  to  sustain  such  inflows  in  terms  of   10 
profitability and confidence. Consequently, the REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate) 
increases, thus eroding competitiveness and increasing trade deficit. Higher level of trade 
deficit  requires  higher  level  of  capital  flows,  and  beyond  some  point  a  cyclical 
dependence sets in.  
 
 
III.E. Foreign Exchange Reserves Adequacy: Measurement 
 
Adequacy  of  forex  reserves  is  an  important  consideration  for  capital  account 
liberalization. With respect to managed-float economies, a passive way in which reserve 
accumulation occurs is as consequence of the exchange rate policy - when the central 
bank intervenes in forex market and buys forex. This is done when huge forex surplus is 
there in the system due to capital inflows. When forex supply exceeds forex demand, 
domestic currency appreciates. The appreciated domestic currency increases the forex-
value of the exportable, thus adversely affecting export-competitiveness. So the central 
bank buys forex in order to prevent this. However, there are costs associated with holding 
huge forex reserves. Increasing the forex reserves beyond a point is problematic for the 
central banks, since it increases liability. 
(Primarily, however, reserves are regarded as “insurance” against external shocks, and 
the  cost  of  holding  and  accumulating  such  reserves  are  considered  the  “insurance 
premium” that a country must bear in order to reap the benefits of globalization and 
integration without suffering from associated shocks)  
In functional form, 
Net  Cost  =  f  [(Marginal  cost  at  which  reserves  are  built)  –  (marginal  return  from 
deployment of reserves)]. Accumulation of excessive reserves can lead to a negative BOP 
problem. This can happen in cases where capital inflows are invested abroad at a lower 
interest rate, whereas investors who bring in capital earn much higher returns payable by 
central bank in forex (when domestic interest rate is higher than international interest 
rate). 
The adequacy of forex reserves can be measured in four forms: 
·  Trade-based measure 
Traditionally, reserves adequacy has been measured in terms of ability to cover ‘X’ 
months of imports. 
·  Debt-based measure 
This form considers the ability of a country’s reserves to cover its debt-servicing 
obligations. 
·  Liquidity-based measure 
This measures the extent to which reserves can fund all capital account liabilities. In 
April 1999, Pablo Guidotti, the then deputy finance minister of Argentina proposed 
that emerging economies should maintain such  a quantum of usable  reserves that 
covers their debt requirements for at least 1 year, so that the reserves should enable 
the country to require no new borrowing for one year. This measure is approximated 
by the ratio of Reserves to (CAD + Short-Term External Debt). 
·  Money-based 
This measure focuses on the extent to which an economy has a domestic currency that 
is backed by forex. It includes measures such as the ratio of Reserves to Broad Money, 
Reserves to Base Money etc. These provide a measure of potential for resident-based 
capital flight from the currency.   11 
III.F. CAC: Cost – Benefit Analysis 
 
Full CAC has both pros and cons. The beneficial effects include the following: 
￿  It leads to more inflow of capital into domestic financial system. Thus 
firms  have  access  to  more  capital,  and  this  reduces  their  cost  of  capital.  A 
reduced  COC  induces  firms  to  invest  more,  expand  more  and  thus  output, 
employment and income expand in medium- to long-run. 
￿  Full  CAC  leads  to  freedom  to  trade  in  financial  assets.  Investors  can 
choose from a wider range of financial products across multiple countries. 
￿  Entry  of  foreign  financial  institutions  results  in  eventual  efficiency  in 
domestic financial system, since such entry increases the number of players in 
the  market,  and  fosters  competition.  In  some  cases,  the  market  could  see  a 
transition from the near-monopoly to near-perfectly competitive market. In order 
to  survive  stiffer  competition,  (domestic)  firms  are  forced  to  become  more 
efficient. This also ensures compliance with international standards of reporting, 
disclosure and best practices. 
￿  As a consequence of full CAC, tax levels converge to international levels. 
￿  As more capital flows in, domestic interest rates are reduced, thus cost of 
government’s domestic borrowing is reduced, and so fiscal deficit shrinks. 
However, the other side of the coin has the following ill-effects: 
￿  An open capital account causes an export of domestic savings abroad, to 
more attractive destinations. In capital-starved countries, such outbound savings-
flight can be ill afforded. 
￿  Increased capital inflows also lead to appreciation of real exchange rate. It 
shifts resources from tradable to non-tradable sectors. 
￿  Premature liberalization and CAC lead to an initial stimulation of capital 
outflows, which by appreciating the real exchange rate, destabilizes the economy. 
￿  Another possible side-effect is generation of financial bubbles. A sudden 
burst could replicate the Asian crisis once again. 
￿  But  the  oft-cited  argument  against  CAC  is  concerning  movements  of 
short-term capital. It is considered to be extremely volatile, highly sensitive to 
domestic and/or international economic, political and financial events, and once 
such an event starts, the extent increases as in a chain-reaction – such investors 
invest  their  capital  only  lured  by  the  prospect  of  short-term  ‘windfall  gains’ 
precipitated  by  interest-rate  differentials  (in  most  cases).  And  once  some 
investors withdraw their capital, the herd mentality is displayed – other ‘arms-
length’ investors also follow suit and withdraw their money. This is known as 
‘capital  flight’.  Once  capital  flight  takes  place,  international  investors  lose 
confidence  on  the  host  country’s  economy.  Creditworthiness  diminishes,  too. 
And the most dangerous consequence of capital flight is that the government has 
to deploy its Forex Reserves to the investors who withdraw the capital, and this 
brings the domestic economy to a highly vulnerable state. This may well start a 
financial disruption and/or currency crisis. 
It  may  be  noted  that  full  capital  account  convertibility  doesn’t  necessarily  lead  to  a 
financial crisis, but it makes the country in question more susceptible to such crises. The 
symptoms of such financial vulnerability are: Inadequate capital base, large bad loans 
(NPA), inappropriate risk management techniques and (politically) connected lending. 
Countries  where  such  symptoms  exist  should  exercise  utmost  caution  while  deciding   12 
whether or not to adopt Full CAC, since these are most vulnerable to any shock, and take 
more time to recover from any external threat. 
 
III.G. CAC and South-East Asian Crisis: A Note   
 
The Asian Crisis of 1997-98 originated from Thailand. The Baht was at that time pegged 
with  US  Dollar.  As  dollar  appreciated,  so  did  Baht,  and  exports  decreased,  export 
competitiveness  also  reduced,  leading  to  increased  current  account  deficit  and  trade 
deficit.  Thailand  was  heavily  reliant  on  foreign  debt  –  with  its  huge  CAD  being 
dependent on foreign investment to stay afloat. Thus there was an increased forex risk. 
As US increased its domestic interest rate, the investors started investing more in the US. 
It led to capital flight. Forex reserves rapidly depleted, and the Thai economy tumbled 
down. At this juncture, Thai government decided to dissociate Baht from the US currency 
and  floated  Baht.  Concurrently,  the  export  growth  in  Thailand  slowed  down  visibly. 
Combination of these factors led to heavy demand for the foreign currency, causing a 
downward pressure on Baht. Asset prices also decreased. But, that time Thailand was 
dominated by “crony capitalism”, so credit was widely available. This resulted in hike of 
asset prices to an unsustainable level – and as asset prices fell, there was heavy default on 
debt obligations. Credit withdrawal started. 
This crisis spread to other countries as a contagion effect. The exchange markets were 
flooded  with  the  crisis  currencies  as  there  were  few  takers.  It  created  a  depreciative 
pressure on the exchange rate. To prevent currency depreciation, the governments were 
forced  to  hike  interest  rates  and  intervene  in  forex  markets,  buying  the  domestic 
currencies with their forex reserves. However, an artificially high interest rate adversely 
affected  domestic  investment,  which  spread  to  GDP,  which  declined,  and  eventually 
economies crashed. 
In this backdrop, the most vicious argument offered by the opponents of full CAC had 
been the role of free currency convertibility. In the absence of any capital control, no 
restrictions were kept on capital outflow, and thus the herd behavior of investor led to 
economic cash of the entire region.  
Thus the Asian currency has taught the following observations and lessons:  
·  Most currency crises arise out of prolonged overvalued X-rate regime. As the 
pressure on the X-Rate increases, there is an increased volatility of the capital 
flows  as  well  as  of  the  X-Rate  itself.  If  the  X-rate  appreciates  too  high,  the 
economy’s export sector becomes unviable by losing export-competitiveness at a 
global  level.  Simultaneously,  imports  become  more  competitive,  thus  CAD 
increases and becomes unsustainable after a certain limit.  
·  Large and unsustainable levels of external and domestic debt had added to the 
crises, too. Thus, the fiscal policies need to be more transparent and forward-
looking. 
·  During  the  crises,  short  term  flows  reacted  quickly  and  negatively.  Either 
receivables  were  postponed  by  debtors  and/or  payables  were  accelerated  by 
creditors. Thus BOP situation worsened. 
·  Domestic  financial  institutions  need  to  be  strong  and  resilient  to  absorb  and 
minimize the shocks so that the internal ripple effect is least. 
·  Gradual CAC is the safest way to adopt. However, even a gradual CAC can not 
fully eliminate the risk of crisis or pressure on forex market. 
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IV: Financial Integration and Capital Account Convertibility: Linkage 
 
Conditions (2) and (3) in the definition of financial integration state that all participants in 
a market have to be given equal access to the specific instrument/product and that they all 
be  treated  equally  while  operating  in  that  market.  Now,  the  more  open  is  the  host 
country’s capital account, the easier it is for international players to enter the market and 
operate  domestically.  From  this  perspective,  a  country  is  ready  to  be  financially 
integrated de-jure to the extent that it opens up its capital account. This doesn’t ensure de-
facto  integration.  The  actual  extent  of  integration  depends  on  the  country’s  financial 
markets’  interaction,  their  interlinking  and  dependence,  and  also  on  the  existing 
regulations and restrictions in both the host and the destination countries.  
When a country  has  a fully convertible currency,  residents can  freely  exchange their 
domestic currency and assets with foreign currency and assets. It ensures unrestricted 
flow of capital from either direction, since no capital control exists. So residents enjoy a 
freedom of choice as regards their investment decisions and destination. This creates a 
multi-fold effect: 
·  If domestic interest rate is higher compared to other countries, global investors 
seeking short term capital gains would invest more there. There would be a surge 
in forex inflows, and if the host country doesn’t have a freely floating X-rate, its 
central bank would resort to sterilization operation to neutralize the pressure on 
X-Rate. Too much of inflow would raise the cost of sterilization. But since the 
cost  of  non-sterilization  can  not  be  quantified,  the  host  can  not  afford  not  to 
sterilize.  Thus  a  trade-off  between  optimal  inflows  and  sterilization  cost  is 
generated.  
·  The  destination  of  such  capital  flows  also  assumes  importance  in  a  fully 
liberalized  economy.  Too  much  investment  in  a  particular  segment  of  the 
financial market can be detrimental to the other segments. Unless the domestic 
financial market is horizontally integrated, such a ‘selective investment’ scenario 
would cause a distortion, and the segment receiving more capital wouldn’t be able 
to circulate the positive effects of it across other segments. Thus, CAC without 
strong (horizontal) financial integration is disruptive.  
·  If domestic interest rate is lower than the global level, in presence of FCAC the 
residents would convert the currency and invest in assets or currencies abroad. 
This would not only cause a “domestic capital flight”, but also would deplete 
domestic saving. The Savings-Investment gap would widen. Also, as the demand 
for  currency  conversion  rises,  the  domestic  currency  loses  its  value  and 
depreciates. In a strongly import-sensitive country (particularly an oil-importer), 
depreciation of its domestic currency would widen the trade deficit, since cost of 
imports  increases.  Simultaneously,  inflationary  pressure  increases,  and  the 
government has to resort to contractionary monetary policy instruments like open-
market operations, increasing the reserve requirements of banks etc which impede 
long-term growth prospects.  
If  the  country  is  financially  well  integrated,  such  shocks  would  ripple  evenly 
across all segments and the overall damage would be less, since various segments 
would capture their “share” of the shock. Otherwise, domestic economy would be 
badly  damaged.  Hence,  Full  CAC  should  be  ideally  preceded  by  horizontal 
financial integration.    14 
·  Financial integration is characterized by market-determined rates. In the absence 
of CAC, the relevant markets are essentially domestic. But once the currency is 
fully convertible, sooner or later the domestic segments have to play with the 
international counterparts, and the rates would be determined by the interaction of 
demand and supply within all these markets. To ensure smooth adoption of a 
globally-determined rate, the domestic financial sector has to be sophisticated and 
equipped  enough  to  handle  any  emergent  exigencies.  Particularly  the  banking 
sector has to be resilient and efficient enough.  
·  A  fully  convertible  capital  account  may  aggravate  the  Lucas  Paradox.  Even 
though the capital/labor ratio is lower in developing/emerging countries, and thus 
return to capital is higher, Lucas observed through empirical evidence that capital 
is not really flowing from developed countries to emerging economies, instead it 
is the other way round: emerging economies are acting as net exporters of capital 
to  the  developed  countries.  This  paradox  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
emerging  economies  have  huge  forex  reserves  which  they  deploy  in  foreign 
country bonds or financial institutions. If the country with CAC is financially 
integrated as well, the effect would be more severe. 
 
V:  Financial Integration in India 
 
This section examines the characteristics, progress and status of financial integration in 
India.  
 
V.A. Characteristics of Indian Financial Integration 
 
Indian financial integration is characterized by three aspects: 
·  Unusually high Forex reserves 
Compared  to  US$  5.8-billion  in  financial  year  1990-91,  India  now  holds  a  forex 
reserve base of US$ 249-billion as on end of current financial year. 
[3] 
(Note: Reserve base has shrunk in 2008-09 owing to sharp appreciation of rupee vis-
à-vis USD – according to an ASSOCHAM study, as on 18
th February 2009, India had 
lost forex reserves equal to 3.5% of GDP due to currency imbalances in previous 5 
months) 


















































































                            Source: Reserve bank on India, Handbook of Statistics 
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·  Highly asymmetric composition of international balance sheet. 
The  asset side  mostly  contains  low-yield  forex  reserves  whereas  the  liability side 
contains higher-return equity instruments. This is a classic position of “long in Debt”, 
“Short in Equity”. 
·  The neoclassical development models predict India to be a net borrower in the 
international  financial  system,  given  her  level  of  development.  But  India  has 
reversed her large net liability position. 
 
V.B. Segments of Indian Financial Market 
 
This sub-section examines the following four segments of Indian financial market: 
·  Equity Market 
·  Debt Market 
·  Money Market and 
·  Forex Market 
Equity Market 
The  equity  market  is  further  segmented  into  Primary  Market  and  Secondary  Market. 
Participation in the equity market is from both retail as well as institutional players. 
Debt Market 
Debt  market  is  further  segmented  into  Government  Securities  (G-Sec)  Market  and 
Corporate Debt Market. 
(a) G-Sec Market 
Even though this segment shows high volume of transactions, it is yet to emerge as a 
deep and liquid market across different maturities, so that the market is able to generate a 
meaningful yield curve. 
(b) Corporate Debt Market 
This segment is not as mature as the G-Sec market. Even now, corporate funding or 
internal resources remain the principal means of corporate funding. However, concurrent 
with  the  growth  of  corporate  sector,  emphasis  should be  put  on  development of  this 
sector, too. Also, this is a virtually illiquid market with least transparency, as it doesn’t 
follow any well established policies. As of now, participants are essentially institutional. 
Money Market 
Money market segments are: 
(a) Overnight Market 
(b) Term Money Market 
This  segment  is  conspicuously  absent  in  India;  however,  without  existence  of  this 
segment,  it  is  difficult  to  develop  a  meaningful  linkage  between  forex  market  and 
domestic currency market. 
(c) Certificate of Deposit (CD)/ Commercial Paper (CP) Market 
(d)Interest Rate Derivatives Market. 
Forex Market 
This comprises Inter-Bank Market and Retail Market. A liberalized capital account would 
result in increased volume and liquidity in spot and derivatives segment of the forex 
market. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
[3]  Forex  reserves  for  2008-09  have  been  considered  as  per  the  latest  available 
information.   16 
Volatility in one segment leads to the same in other markets depending on the extent of 
integration. The rate of interest prevailing in different market segments would ideally 
reflect their risk-reward relationship. Interest rate and exchange rate are interlinked. In an 
efficient  market,  the  forward  margin  on  exchange  rate  should  equal  the  interest  rate 
differential between two currencies.  
Full  CAC  requires  well  developed  and  tightly  integrated  markets.  Otherwise,  shocks 
generated in one market wouldn’t be transmitted to others. Such a financial system can 
not absorb shocks with minimal damage. 
 
V.C. Extent of Financial Integration in India 
 
As observed by Tarapore Committee-II in July 2006, Indian financial market segments 
are not yet well-integrated, and some segments are either in the nascent stage or non-
existent. Also, the Financial Market Depth, approximated by the ratio of M2 to GDP, is 
growing too slowly as following figures indicate: 
[4] 































































































          (a) Financial Depth (M2/GDP)                 (b) Change in Financial Depth (%) 
Source: RBI and Author’s calculations 
The horizontal integration itself is in its formative stage. But India is gradually opening 
up her doors to vertical integration forms. Still the country is far away  from a well-
developed integrated state with such shallow market. 
 
VI. Capital Account Convertibility in India 
 
VI.A. Exchange Rate Regime in India 
 
This section makes a note of the X-rate regime followed by India post-BOP crisis.  
Till 1991, India followed an X-rate regime of a Crawling Peg to USD. After the acute 
BOP  crisis  and  the  subsequent  intervention  by  IMF,  India  was  forced  to  accept  the 
Structural Adjustment Package of IMF and in 1993, adopted a “market-determined” X-
rate regime de jure. However, owing to heavy intervention by Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI), this X-rate regime has become a  Managed  Float de facto. RBI has adopted  a 
policy of keeping the X-rate within a sustainable level and thus often buys and sells forex 
in order to keep the rupee within a pre-targeted band. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
[4] In 1996-97 there is a sudden dip in M2/GDP ratio due to a sudden sharp fall in M2. 
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Against all USD, GBP and Euro, the Rupee has been showing a long-run appreciating 
trend. However, there is a sharp appreciation of rupee against USD and Euro in 2008-09. 
[5]  
 
VI.B. Trade Openness in India  
 
During 1990-91 before opening up, India had total exports, imports, trade deficit and 
current  account  deficit  to  the  extent  of  USD  Billion  18.15  ,  24.07  ,  5.93  and  9.68 
respectively. As on 2007-08, the values in terms of USD Billion were 159.01, 239.65, 
80.64 and 17.4 respectively: 
 
























Source: RBI Trade Statistics 
However,  in  terms  of  GDP,  the  Exports/GDP,  Imports/GDP,  Trade  deficit/GDP  and 
CAD/GDP ratios in 1990-91 were 0.063, 0.084, 0.021 and 0.034. In 2007-08, these ratios 
shot up to 0.149, 0.224, 0.075 and 0.016.    
________________________________________________________________________ 
[5] The latest X-rates have been considered from RBI website for the year 2008-09. 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Above  charts  reveal  a  continuously  rising  trend  in  both  exports  and  imports,  though 
imports have been rising faster than exports (mostly on account on sharp hike in oil 
prices), thus generating an increase in trade deficit. 
 
V.C. Pre-Conditions of CAC in India: Tarapore Committee Recommendations (I) 
 
After liberating the current account in 1995, Government of India decided to examine its 
readiness to adopt capital account convertibility. Accordingly, Tarapore Committee was 
set  up  in  1997  by  Reserve  Bank  of  India  to  develop  a  roadmap  to  full  CAC.  This 
committee laid down following pre-conditions to be satisfied before India adopts CAC 
gradually over a period of 3 years (1997-2000). 
1. Gross Fiscal Deficit/GDP ratio should come down to 3.5% by 1999-2000 from 4.5% as 
in 1997-98. 
2. Previous 3-years annual average rate of inflation should lie between 3-5%  for the 
period 1997-2000. 
3. Gross NPA (Non-Performing Asset) of public sector banks should come down to 5% 
by 2000 from 13.7% as in 1997. 
4.  Average effective Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) should come down to 3% from 9.3% as 
in 1997-98. 
5. There should be a rising trend in Current Receipts/GDP ratio. 
6. The Debt-Servicing Ratio should come down to 20% from 25% as in 1997. 
7. Forex Reserve Adequacy has to be measured using four indicators. 
8. Minimum NFA/Currency ratio of 40% has to be prescribed by law in the RBI Act. 
9. Government of India should set up a Consolidated Sinking Fund. 
10. Current Account Deficit (CAD)/GDP Ratio to come down to the level of 2-3%. 
 
V.D. India’s Performance on above Criteria 
 
The graphical representation of the status as regards above pre-conditions can be divided 
into three parts: Pre-Tarapore committee position (1991-1997), the period for which these 
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(i) Gross Fiscal Deficit/GDP                               





























        (a) Period: 1990-91 to 1996-97                    (b) Period: 1996-97 to 1999-2000 
  















































      (c) Period: 2000-01 to 2007-08              (d) GDP & Fiscal Deficit: Change (1991-97) 
Source: RBI Fiscal Statistics and author’s calculations 
Above figures reveal the following points. First, Panel (d) clearly indicates that in the 
pre-Tarapore  period  (1991-97),  GDP  had  been  growing  at  an  almost  constant  rate, 
whereas fiscal deficits had been sharply increasing since 1994-95. Considering this, the 
prescription (reducing Fiscal Deficit/GDP ratio to 3.5% in three years) itself looks pre-
mature.  The  time  period  recommended  (3  years)  for  achieving  this  result  certainly 
doesn’t represent “gradualism”. Panel (a) shows that Gross Fiscal deficit/GDP ratio has 
come down to the level of less than 6% after five years. Panel (b) depicts utter failure of 
the fiscal criterion set by Tarapore committee: during the 3 years, the ratio has indeed 
gone up than come down. It is only in 2006-07 that the ratio is less than 4% (Panel (c)). 
Thus, this criterion would prove an unstable one for judging India’s readiness to adopt 
FCAC: 3.3% in a single year (2007-08) is not safe enough to go for it.  
 
(ii) Three-Years’ Average Inflation Rate   20 














































      (a) Period: 1992-93 to 1996-97                 (b) Period: 1997-98 to 1999-2000 


















(c) Period: 2000-01 to 2007-08 
Panel (a) makes the criterion of a 3-years average inflation rate hovering between 3-5% 
questionable, as for 5 years preceding the Tarapore Committee, the same has never been 
less than 8%. During the stipulated period (1997-2000), it has decreased continuously 
from 5.67% to 4.53% (Panel (b)). But in the following period, the average rate has mostly 
been above the 5% limit (Panel (c)). Thus, Indian performance has been non-satisfactory 
on this criterion as well. 
[6] 
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      (a) Period: 1996-97 to 1999 -2000                   (b) Period: 2000-01 to 2007-08 
Source: RBI and author’s calculations 
______________________________________________________________________ 
[6] During 2008-09 inflation rate has shown sharp increase followed by a decrease in 
subsequent months, and the average value for the year has not thus been approximated. 
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(iii) Gross NPA of Public Sector Banks (PSB) 
The committee’s recommendation on the Gross NPA % has not been possible in India. 
As panel (a) shows, during the prescribed period, the Gross NPA assumed a minimum 
value of 14% as against the 5% prescribed. It came down below 6% only in 2004-05. 
(iv) Average effective CRR 



























        (a) Period: 1990-91 to 1996-97               (b) Period: 1997-98 to 1999-2000 



















(c)  Period: 2000-01 to 2008-09 
                                                               Source: RBI 
All the above panels show failure on CRR count as well: The lowest level of CRR during 
the entire period from 1990-91 to 2008-09 has been 4.5 %. 
(v) Debt-Servicing Ratio 






























          (a) Period: 1990-91 to 1996-97                    (c) Period: 1997-98 to 1999-2000   22 

















(b) Period: 2000-01 to 2008-09 
                                                               Source: RBI 
Above panels show that debt-servicing ratio has never touched the prescribed 20% level. 
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(vii) Current Account Deficit (CAD)/GDP Ratio 
































































(c)  Period: 2000-01 to 2007-08 
                            Source: RBI and author’s calculations 
Panel  (a)  shows  that  pre-Tarapore  period  registered  CAD/GDP  ratios  between  1-2%. 
Based  on  that,  the  prescription  of  containing  the  ratio  within  2%  has  not  only  been 
achieved in the recommended period (Panel (b)), but also during the period following it 
(except the year 2003-04) (Panel (c)). 
 

































        (a) Exports/GDP %: 1990-2008                    (b) Imports/GDP %: 1990-2008 
However,  the  following  point  needs  a  mention.  Viability  of  CAD  is  a  function  of 
availability of normal capital flows as opposed to any form of exceptional financing. If   24 
Net Capital (In)Flows regularly exceed the CAD requirements, viability also increases, 
by way of increasing forex reserves to the extent of the excess NCF. 
Figure 15: NCF, CAD, (NCF-CAD):  USD Billion



















Figure 15 captures the movement of CAD, NCF and the excess of NCF over CAD for the 
period 1990-91 to 2007-08.  Except the years 1990-91 and 1995-96, the NCF has always 
well-exceeded the CAD requirements (In 2007-08, the NCF has jumped from USD 46 
Billion to USD 108 Billion owing to sharp rise in Foreign Investment, Loans, Banking 
Capital and Other Capital). 
[7] 
 
 (ix) Reserve Adequacy Measures 
Following are the charts showing the various Reserves Adequacy Measures for India. 
They are computed as: 
1. Trade-Based: Number of months of imports to be covered by the existing reserves (i.e. 
the Reserves/No. of Import-Months). 
2. Debt-based:  Extent of Debt-service covered by existing reserves (i.e. Reserves/Interest 
Expense).  Another  metric  used  is:  Reserves  to  (Cumulative  FPI+STED).  This  metric 
recognizes FPI as a debt liability of Indian government, and it fully captures the adequacy 
of reserves against the possibility of an acute capital flight scenario. 
3. Liquidity-Based: Reserves to (CAD+STED) ratio. 
4. Money-based: The metrics used are: (Reserves/Broad money), (Reserves/Base Money) 
and (Reserves/ (Broad money + Base money)). 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
[7] The sharp hike in NCF is attributable to the following components: 
·  Foreign Investment: From USD 15.5 Billion to 44.8 Billion, out of which 
￿  FDI: From USD 8.5 Billion to 15.5 Billion 
￿  FPI:  From USD 7.1 Billion to 29.3 Billion 
·  Loans: From USD 24.5 Billion to 42 Billion 
·  Banking Capital: From USD 1.9 Billion to 11.8 Billion 
·  Other Capital: From USD 3.9 Billion to 9.6 Billion) 
   25 






















   






















































































































    (c) Reserves/ (Cumulative FPI + STED)             (d) Reserves/ (CAD + STED) 



















































































































































          (e)Reserves/ Base Money(M0)                   (f) Reserves/ Broad Money(M2) 
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(g) Reserves/ (M0+M2)                           (h) Cumulative FPI, USD Billion     
                                               Source: Author’s calculations 
 
First, the trade-based indicator shows that from just over 2 months of import cover in 
1990-91, India now has an import cover of more than 15 months, which is way above the 
generally accepted ‘safe’ level of 3 or 6 months. Next, the Reserves/Debt-Service ratio 
has shot up from 0.5 to 7.2 over the period. This indicates a comfortable level of debt-
servicing using the reserves during exigency. Third, if we consider the sum of cumulative 
FPI  and  short-term  external  debt  (STED),  it  has increased  from  USD  1.76  billion  to 
138.15  billion  during  the  period  (Data  Appendix:  1),  and  the  Reserves/  (Cumulative 
FPI+STED) ratio has come down from 3.3 to 2.2. However, this can be credited to the 
sharp increase in the denominator. By this count, the reserves are adequate to cover the 
external debt. Fourth, sum of current account deficit and STED has risen from USD 11.4 
billion to 61.7 billion during the period , and Reserves/ (CAD+STED) ratio has increased 
from  0.51  to  5.02,  indicating  more than  adequate  liquidity  position  to  repay  external 
sector payments in foreign currency. Finally, all the money-based measures have shown 
an almost continually rising trend, excepting the year 1995-96 when all the measures 
showed  a  moderate/sharp  decline,  owing  to  the  fact  that  reserves  showed  a  negative 
change of 14% in that year. 
 
 
V.E. Tarapore Committee-II: Recommendations 
 
In July 2006, the Prime Minister of India declared the government’s intention to adopt 
full CAC and hence the second round of Tarapore Committee was set up. The committee, 
in its report, suggested following observations and recommendations. 
·  The sequential FCAC would be adopted in three phases: 2006-07 (Phase-I), 2007-
08 and 2008-09 (Phase-II) and 2009-10 and 2010-11 (Phase-III). 
·  FIIs should be banned from investing fresh capital thru issue of fresh Participatory 
Notes. PNs should be gradually phased out. 
·  Industrial houses should be allowed and encouraged to set up banks. 
·  Discriminatory  tax  treaties  (like  Double  Tax  Avoidance  Treaties  or  DTAA) 
should be abolished, since they are incompatible with the concept of FCAC.  
·  For resident corporate, the ceiling for financial capital transfer abroad should be 
relaxed from 25% of their net worth.   27 
·  Overseas investment ceiling for resident corporate should be relaxed from 200% 
of their net worth. 
·  ECB (External Commercial Borrowing) limit per annum should be increased. 
·  Ceiling for loans and borrowings by resident banks from overseas banks should 
be relaxed from 25% of their unimpaired tier-I capital. 
·  Ceiling for remittance abroad by resident individuals should be enhanced beyond 
USD25 Million. 
 
V.F. India’s Performance against the Pre-Conditions 
 
The previous discussion clearly indicates the following: 
·  On the fiscal front, India has performed poorly. The fiscal deficit/GDP ratio has 
not  been  contained  within  the  prescribed  limit.  Concurrently,  domestic 
liabilities/GDP ratio has been continuously rising (See below). 


















Source: RBI and author’s calculations 
·  Average inflation rate has stayed higher than the recommended band. 
·  Debt-servicing ratio has not at all responded to the recommendation. 
·  Average effective CRR has remained much higher than the floor. 
·  However, the gross NPA ratio of public sector banks has come down remarkably. 
·  India’s external sector has registered positive performance. The exports/GDP ratio 
and import/GDP ratio have gone up. CAD/GDP ratio has been contained within 
the 2-3% band on a continuous basis. 
Thus Tarapore Committee’s recommendations have mostly not been implemented, since 
the prescribed conditions were not met. Time-frame wise, it is clear that the committee’s 
suggestions and recommendations were premature by at least 10 years, if not more. 
 
VII: Is India Ready for Full CAC Considering the State of Financial 
Integration? 
 
As the previous sections discuss, Indian financial integration is still in a nascent and 
developing  stage.  The  financial  market  is  not  even horizontally  integrated.  In such  a 
situation, if India goes for FCAC, vertical integration would be forced upon the players at 
some point of time. But owing to lack of horizontal integration, any benefits from vertical 
integration  would  be  confined  within  the  recipient  segment  only  and  would  not  be   28 
distributed to other segments. This would create distortion and subsequent complications. 
Also, once such distortion sets in, with full CAC, dissatisfied players in the adversely 
affected segments would move out to international markets. This would not only cause a 
capital and savings flight but also an erosion of confidence in that segment. 
One of the strongest backbones of a CAC-ready economy is its banking and financial 
sector. Existence of a strong and resilient banking sector is an essential pre-requisite for 
any country. Indian banking scenario doesn’t conform to such a criterion. The sector is 
still  dominated  by  public  sector  banks  with  relatively  weak  presence  of  private  and 
foreign banks. Following graphs bring home the point: 


























                      (a) Year: 2006-07                                            (b) Year: 2007-08 
In  both  the  years,  the  Public  Sector  Banks  contribute  most  to  Capital  (Reserves  and 
Surplus included), Income, Deposits, Investments and Advances made. However, Return 
on Assets is least for the PSB segment as shown in Figure 19: 























The  weak  performance  by  the  private  sector  and  foreign  banks  can  be  attributed  to: 
Relatively late entry (the most profitable private banks started operating from mid-1990s), 
Lower scale of operations (in terms of customer base and spread) and higher degree of 
regulations and prohibitions (more applicable for foreign banks). 
Thus it’s evident that financial integration has mostly excluded the banking sector in 
India as of now. The adverse effects of CAC would have to be mostly absorbed by the 
public banks, whose efficiency has rooms for doubt, being preceded by a long era of 
Figure 18(a): Capital, Income,Deposits, 

























































Banks  29 
protectionism. But post-CAC, they are expected to deal with multi-currency transactions. 
The risks involved are: 
·  Currency Risk: Effect of currency appreciation/depreciation 
·  Counterparty Credit Risk 
·  Transfer  Risk:  Generated  from  tracking  financial  position  of  all  economies 
involved 
·  Legal Risk. 
It is still doubtful whether the state-protected banks would be able to ward the risks off. 
India also falls short of most of the criteria suggested by the first Tarapore Committee. 
The 3-year phasing plan of CAC as conceived in 1997 has not been fully effective even 
11 years down the line. Without the pre-conditions strongly in place, no country can 
safely adopt CAC (as mentioned earlier, capital controls are virtually irreversible so far as 
international investor confidence is concerned).  
Two  crucial  questions  arise  during  evaluation  of  India’s  readiness  to  adopt  full 
convertibility:  First,  are  the  indicators  which  conform  to  the  levels  suggested  by  the 
Committee sustainable in future, or are significant deviations from current levels to be 
expected, say 10 years down the line? Second, when, if at all, the non-conforming criteria 
are expected to converge to the recommended level or band? The following sub-sections 
explore these two issues. 
 
VII.A. Question 1: Sustainability of Conforming Criteria 
 
Previous  sections  identify  the  following  counts  on  which  India  performed  as 
recommended by the Committee: 
(a) Trade and External Sector 
(b) Reserves Adequacy, and 
(c) Gross NPA of Public Sector Banks. 
The  following  discussion  examines  the  sustainability  of  similar  performance  of  these 
three measures, using a Trend Projection Method. 
[8] 
 
(a) Trade and External Sector  
The  indicators  of  external/trade  sector  performance  considered  are:  Exports,  Imports, 
Trade Deficit, and Current Account Deficit: both in Absolute Value





[8] Period under Consideration: 
Historical: 1997-98 to 2007-08 
Projection: 2008-09 to 2017-18 
[9] For Trend Equations see Technical Note. 
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Figure 20(a): External Sector:Historical 































































Figure 20(b): External Sector:Historical 





















(a) Exports, Imports, CAD, Trade Deficit     (b) X/GDP, M/GDP, CAD/GDP, TD/GDP 
All the four indicators show a steadily increasing trend over the period in absolute value 
terms.  
A near-steady increasing trend is observed when these indicators are expressed as a ratio 
to GDP, except the CAD/GDP ratio which stays contained in a certain band. This is a 
healthy indicator showing that CAD doesn’t increase more-than-proportionately with a 
rise in GDP, so the GDP growth is sufficient enough to sustain the increase in CAD. 
[10] 
 
(b) Reserves Adequacy 
This  sub-section  checks  the  seven  Adequacy  Indicators  for  Forex  Reserves,  namely: 
[Reserves/Number of Import-Months], [Reserves/Debt Service], [Reserves/ (Cumulative 
FPI+STED)], [Reserves/ (CAD+STED)], [Reserves/Base Money (M0)], [Reserves/Broad 
Money (M2)], and [Reserves/ (M0+M2)]. 
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Reserves Adequacy Indicators: Historical (1997-2008) and Projected (2008 – 2018) 
All the indicators, despite showing fluctuations, register an increasing trend that bolsters 
the  reserves  adequacy  scenario  of  India  in  future.  Hence,  forex  reserves  tend  to  be 
adequate for absorbing the outcomes of large capital inflow, post-CAC. 
 
(c) Gross NPA % of Public Sector Banks (PSB) 















The  projected  trend  line  shows  that  after  2010-11,  the  gross  NPA  %  increases 
continuously up to end of period considered. However, the trend projection method has 
not been subject to rigorous statistical testing and so this rising trend is questionable. This 
aspect, thus, can not be commented upon.  
 
VII.B. Question 2: Convergence of Non-Conforming Criteria to Target Levels 
 
The criteria that were not fulfilled by the Committee were: 
(a) Fiscal Deficit/GDP Ratio 
(b) Cash Reserve Ratio 
(b) Debt Servicing Ratio 
(d) Last 3-months Average Inflation Rate. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
[10] GDP Growth rate has not been individually computed due to fluctuations caused by 
global sub-prime crises. Such measurement being out of scope of this paper, (CAD/GDP) 
ratio has been directly projected. 
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The following section discusses, using the same technique, the approximate timeline by 
when, if at all, the criteria would converge to the prescribed level. 
 
(a) Fiscal Deficit/GDP 
 




















As against the prescribed Fiscal Deficit/GDP ratio of 3.5% by 1999-2000, the trend line 
reaches this target value in the year 2013-14. 
[11]  
 
(b) Cash Reserve Ratio 
 


















The lowest historical value of CRR was 4% in 2003-04. Since then it has never touched 
that level and assumed a highest historical value of 8.5%. 
[12] As the trend shows, there is 
an increasing trend in CRR after that. So CRR being at 3% is not a feasible possibility. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
[11] Fiscal Deficit/GDP ratio is projected in entirety. No statistical testing was done, so 
these  are  gross  estimates  based  on  a  fully  autonomous  and  non-regressive  trend 
projection method. 
[12] For data values see Data Appendix: Projected Values 
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Historically  DSR  has  always  stayed  above  the  20%-mark  recommendation.  The 
projection  shows  an  increasing  trend  as  well. 
[13]  In  India,  interest  expense  covers 
approximately a quarter of total expenditure. Recovery from such “potential debt trap” 
situation seems a much difficult task, given present circumstances. 
 
 (d) Last 3-Months Average Inflation Rate 

















Historically, average annual inflation hovered around 5% but it was never as low as 3%, 
[14] the lower limit of the prescribed 3% - 5% band. Even if the projection is too steep to 
be feasible, there has not been considerable decline in inflation rate to reach 3%. 
[15] 
Thus the preceding sections show that while the fulfilled criteria show a tendency of 
being sustainable, the same can not be said about the rest. These are either met with at 
least a 15-year lag, or are not met at all in next 10 years. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 [13] Rough estimate, refer note [11]  
[14] For Data values see Data Appendix: Historical Values 
[15] Currently India’s inflation rate is 0.27%, and it is clearly heading for a deflationary 
stage. In the  year 2008-09 itself, inflation rate first reached 12% ceiling, then started 
falling drastically and came down to 0.27%. Such situation being an outlier, its effect has 
been excluded from scope of the discussion. 
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Accordingly, it can be concluded that the issue of viability of India adopting full capital 
account convertibility is still questionable. Adoption of the Second Tarapore Committee 
recommendations is not feasible at this stage, since the essential pre-conditions set by the 
Committee itself in a prior period have not been fulfilled still. These pre-conditions were 
cited by the Committee as the pillar of India’s readiness to adopt CAC.  
Advancing  to  fuller  convertibility  of  the  currency  without  ensuring  the  basic 
requirements firmly at place would cause bifurcations in the economy. Even though the 
corporate sector would largely benefit from CAC since they can access cheaper capital, 
thus augmenting investment decisions that would certainly bring medium-to-long-term 
benefits to the country, the short-term interests of the masses would be adversely affected. 
Since possibility of a currency and/or financial crisis can not be ruled out, political unrest 
could also set in.  
As  of  now,  India  should  focus  on  ensuring  tight  horizontal  integration  first,  in  its 
financial market. Unless the internal market segments are well-coordinated, any positive 
or negative outcome of vertical integration or capital account liberalization generated in 
one segment of the market would not spread to other segments. If negative shocks are 
generated, then the recipient segment would have to fully bear the brunt as it can not 
distribute the shock to other segments. Hence that segment would likely get crashed. Also, 
if positive stimulations are received by any segment, then too it gets contained in that 
segment only, so investors and players in other market segments would perceive this 
segment  as  more  attractive  and  “domestic  capital  flight”  would  be  generated.  The 
remaining segments would dry up, causing distortion in entire financial market. 
Clubbing this situation with full CAC offers much reason for concern. Capital would 
flow in and go out at the simplest sign of positive or negative signals generated by any 
part of the economy, and also by any global movements. In that case India should need a 
rigorous  regulatory  and  monitoring  authoritative  body  in  place  which  would  have 
effective system for anticipating investor behavior and intervening at the right moment to 
ensure  domestic  stability,  prevention  of  disruption  and  mass  interests.  Currently  the 
regulator system in India is not so robust. Frequent stock market crashes make home this 
point. Finally, India can no longer claim being “De-coupled” from western developed 
world. The current global financial crisis has impacted Indian economy adversely, even 
though after a time lag. GDP growth has declined, employment generation slowed down 
much, and the services sector – that contributes to more than half of India’s GDP – is 
finding it vulnerable, being heavily reliant on the crisis-affected countries. The country is 
now at the brink of much uncertainty. 
 
Thus, multiple trades-off exist in Indian economy now: that between corporate sector and 
citizens,  between  ‘now’  and  ‘later’,  and  between  internal  strengthening  and  external 
collaboration. A rigorous cost-benefit analysis has to be done before ensuring further 
capital account liberalization keeping financial integration at the background. It will not 
be prudent to adopt a virtually irreversible policy stance at this uncertain juncture.  
 
So it is concluded that India is not ready for full capital account convertibility, but it 
should prepare the grounds for adopting CAC in future, with a robust roadmap. But the 
exact timeframe of complete readiness still remains highly futuristic at this point. 
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Data Appendix: Historical Data 
 





Exports  Imports  CAD  T.D.  Cum 
FPI  NCF  NCF-
CAD 
1990-91  5.8  18.1  24.1  9.7  5.9  0.0  7.1  -2.6 
1991-92  9.2  17.9  19.4  1.2  1.5  0.0  3.9  2.7 
1992-93  9.8  18.5  21.9  3.5  3.3  0.3  3.9  0.4 
1993-94  19.3  22.2  23.3  1.2  1.1  3.8  8.9  7.7 
1994-95  25.2  26.3  28.7  3.4  2.3  7.6  8.5  5.1 
1995-96  21.7  31.8  36.7  5.9  4.9  10.4  4.1  -1.8 
1996-97  26.4  33.5  39.1  4.6  5.7  13.7  12.0  7.4 
1997-98  29.4  35.0  41.5  5.5  6.5  15.5  9.8  4.3 
1998-99  32.5  33.2  42.4  4.0  9.2  15.5  8.4  4.4 
1999-
2000  38.0  36.8  49.7  4.7  12.9  18.5  10.4  5.7 
2000-01  42.3  44.6  50.5  2.7  6.0  21.3  8.8  6.2 
2001-02  54.1  43.8  51.4  3.4  7.6  23.3  8.6  12.0 
2002-03  76.1  52.7  61.4  6.3  8.7  24.3  10.8  17.2 
2003-04  113.0  63.8  78.2  14.1  14.3  35.6  16.7  30.8 
2004-05  141.5  83.5  111.5  2.5  28.0  45.0  28.0  25.6 
2005-06  151.6  103.1  149.2  9.9  46.1  57.4  25.5  15.6 
2006-07  199.2  126.4  185.7  9.8  59.3  64.4  45.8  36.0 
2007-08  309.7  159.0  239.7  17.4  80.6  93.8  108.0  90.6 
2008-09  249.0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
 
FX-Res: Forex Reserves 
CAD: Current Account Deficit 
T.D. Trade Deficits (Exports – Imports) 
NCF: Net capital Flows 
Cum FPI: Cumulative FPI 
 
2) Banking Sector Statistics: In INR Billion 
(a) 2006-07                                              (b) 2007-08 




















56.6  39.7  17.6 
 Total Income  62.5  24.75  8.61  Total 
Income  82  38  13 
Deposits  680.4  220.8  51.98  Deposits  840  294  68 
Investments  226.5  85.6  24.65  Investments  267.6  121  35 
Advances  478.9  165.9  43.57  Advances  601.9  225  58 
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3) Average X-Rate: INR vis-à-vis       4) X/GDP, M/GDP, CAD/GDP, TD/GDP  
 
  USD  GBP  Euro    X/GDP  M/GDP  CAD/GDP  TD/GDP 
1990-
91  17.94  33.19  11.44 
1990-
91  0.063  0.084  0.034  0.021 
1991-
92  24.47  42.52  14.62 
1991-
92  0.074  0.081  0.004  0.006 
1992-
93  30.65  51.69  19.59 
1992-
93  0.079  0.093  0.019  0.014 
1993-
94  31.37  47.21  18.74 
1993-
94  0.088  0.092  0.005  0.004 
1994-
95  31.40  48.82  20.20 
1994-
95  0.089  0.097  0.011  0.008 
1995-
96  33.45  52.35  23.40 
1995-
96  0.098  0.113  0.018  0.015 
1996-
97  35.50  56.36  22.92 
1996-
97  0.094  0.110  0.013  0.016 
1997-
98  37.16  61.02  20.96 
1997-
98  0.093  0.110  0.015  0.017 
1998-
99  42.07  69.55  24.18 
1998-
99  0.086  0.110  0.010  0.024 
1999-
2000  43.33  69.85  44.79 
1999-
2000  0.089  0.120  0.011  0.031 
2000-
01  45.68  67.55  41.48 
2000-
01  0.106  0.120  0.006  0.014 
2001-
02  47.69  68.32  42.18 
2001-
02  0.100  0.117  0.008  0.017 
2002-
03  48.40  74.82  48.09 
2002-
03  0.113  0.131  0.014  0.019 
2003-
04  45.95  77.74  53.99 
2003-
04  0.116  0.141  0.025  0.026 
2004-
05  44.93  82.86  56.51 
2004-
05  0.130  0.174  0.004  0.044 
2005-
06  44.27  79.05  53.91 
2005-
06  0.139  0.202  0.013  0.062 
2006-
07  45.28  85.73  58.11 
2006-
07  0.151  0.222  0.012  0.071 
2007-
08  40.24  80.80  56.99 
2007-
08  0.149  0.224  0.016  0.075 
2008-
09  50.73   72.52   64.57  
 
X/GDP: Exports/GDP Ratio 
M/GDP: Exports/GDP Ratio 
TD/GDP: Trade Deficit/GDP Ratio 
DL/GDP: Domestic Liabilities/GDP % 
R/M: Reserves/No. of Import-Months 
R/DS: Reserves/Debt-Service Ratio, R/(F+S): Reserves/(Cumulative FPI+STED) 
R/(C+S): Reserves/ (CAD+STED) 
Average Inflation: Previous 3-Months’ Average Annual Inflation rate 
DSR: Debt-Service Ratio 
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1990-91  5.813   0.204   1990-91  21.26   65.5     NA 
1991-92  5.905   0.239   1991-92  37.03   64.2     1.64 
1992-93  6.061   0.253   1992-93  37.93   64.1  11.37  -2.78 
1993-94  6.045   0.259   1993-94  71.66   65.3  10.73  -8.12 
1994-95  6.202   0.274   1994-95  85.64   63.8  10.37  3.69 
1995-96  6.125   0.281   1995-96  73.29   62.5  9.67  0.86 
1996-97  3.161   0.296   1996-97  83.26   60.6  8.40  -1.79 
1997-98  6.437   0.283   1997-98  97.12   63.4  5.67  -2.21 
1998-99  6.692   0.279   1998-99  111.96   64.3  4.97  -6.96 
1999-
2000  7.093   0.303  
1999-
2000  111.34   69.5  4.53  6.72 
2000-01  7.631   0.305   2000-01  123.94   73.7  5.47  3.15 
2001-02  8.123   0.297   2001-02  136.92   79.2  4.70  -5.56 
2002-03  8.053   0.285   2002-03  152.20   84.5  4.73  5.86 
2003-04  8.801   0.263   2003-04  178.63   86.5  4.17  3.16 
2004-05  8.880   0.255   2004-05  193.07   86.9  5.13  4.85 
2005-06  9.058   0.262   2005-06  189.72   85.0  5.47  4.38 
2006-07  9.367   0.258   2006-07  202.39   81.5  5.43  6.76 
2007-08  10.047   0.242   2007-08  250.32   81.7  4.83  6.16 
 
 
7) Reserve Adequacy Measures  
 
  R/M  R/DS  R/(F+S)  R/(C+S)  R/M0  R/M2  R/(M0+M2) 
1990-91  2.89   0.531   3.303   0.507   0.012   0.004   0.003  
1991-92  5.70   0.897   4.827   2.995   0.023   0.007   0.005  
1992-93  5.39   0.989   2.212   1.274   0.024   0.007   0.006  
1993-94  9.91   1.644   2.637   4.150   0.040   0.013   0.010  
1994-95  10.55   1.811   2.264   3.678   0.043   0.014   0.011  
1995-96  7.09   1.486   1.491   2.156   0.035   0.011   0.008  
1996-97  8.10   1.596   1.271   2.258   0.042   0.024   0.015  
1997-98  8.50   1.766   1.301   2.342   0.046   0.013   0.010  
1998-99  9.20   1.772   1.602   3.672   0.049   0.013   0.010  
1999-
2000  9.19   1.838   1.504   3.311   0.053   0.013   0.010  
2000-01  10.04   1.986   1.301   3.040   0.058   0.013   0.011  
2001-02  12.63   2.457   1.876   6.039   0.070   0.015   0.013  
2002-03  14.87   3.068   2.585   6.603   0.088   0.020   0.016  
2003-04  17.35   3.950   2.418   4.487   0.105   0.022   0.018  
2004-05  15.23   4.877   2.270   7.125   0.126   0.024   0.020  
2005-06  12.20   5.100   1.974   5.181   0.109   0.023   0.019  
2006-07  12.87   5.778   2.193   5.510   0.117   0.024   0.020  
2007-08  15.51   7.199   2.242   5.019   0.131   0.029   0.023  
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/GDP  Imports/GDP  CAD/GDP  Trade 
Deficit/GDP 
2008-09  209.3  316.3  119.4  26.9  0.145  0.204  0.0115  0.0776 
2009-10  264.1  412.9  164.1  37.4  0.149  0.211  0.0113  0.0885 
2010-11  331.3  533.6  221.0  51.4  0.154  0.219  0.0111  0.1002 
2011-12  412.6  682.2  292.0  69.7  0.158  0.227  0.0109  0.1127 
2012-13  510.0  862.6  379.4  93.0  0.163  0.235  0.0107  0.126 
2013-14  625.6  1079.2  485.5  122.2  0.167  0.242  0.0105  0.1401 
2014-15  761.3  1336.5  612.6  158.1  0.171  0.250  0.0103  0.155 
2015-16  919.6  1639.3  763.6  201.7  0.176  0.258  0.0101  0.1707 
2016-17  1102.7  1992.7  941.1  254.1  0.180  0.265  0.0099  0.1872 
2017-18  1313.2  2402.1  1148.0  316.3  0.185  0.273  0.0097  0.2045 
 
  Gross 
NPA % 
Fiscal 
Deficit/GDP %  CRR %  DSR %  Inflation % 
2008-09  2.09  4.3  8.50   0.254   6.21 
2009-10  1.77  4.1  6.26  0.347  6.95 
2010-11  1.85  4.0  6.50  0.370  7.81 
2011-12  2.40  3.8  6.83  0.402  8.81 
2012-13  3.47  3.6  7.23  0.443  9.93 
2013-14  5.12  3.5  7.72  0.495  11.19 
2014-15  7.43  3.3  8.29  0.560  12.57 
2015-16  10.45  3.1  8.94  0.640  14.09 
2016-17  14.26  3.0  9.68  0.736  15.73 
2017-18  18.90  2.8  10.49  0.851  17.51 
 
  R/M  R/DS  R/(Cum- 
FPI+STED) 
R/(CAD+ST
ED)  R/M0  R/M2  R/(M0+M2) 
2008-09  15.5  5.76  3.10  6.13  0.130  0.026  0.022 
2009-10  15.8  6.08  3.50  6.32  0.136  0.027  0.023 
2010-11  16.1  6.40  3.94  6.51  0.143  0.028  0.024 
2011-12  16.4  6.72  4.43  6.69  0.150  0.029  0.025 
2012-13  16.6  7.04  4.97  6.86  0.157  0.031  0.026 
2013-14  16.9  7.36  5.55  7.02  0.164  0.032  0.027 
2014-15  17.0  7.68  6.17  7.18  0.170  0.033  0.028 
2015-16  17.2  8.00  6.85  7.33  0.177  0.034  0.029 
2016-17  17.3  8.32  7.56  7.47  0.184  0.035  0.030 









1) Exports (USD Billion) 
    Y = 0.0049 X
4 – 0.1048 X
3 + 0.7232 X
2 + 0.7126 X + 14.698 
2) Imports (USD Billion) 
    Y = 0.0111 X
4 – 0.2855 X
3 + 2.5333 X
2 – 5.8681 X + 24.905 
3) Current Account Deficit (CAD) (USD Billion) 
     Y = 0.0026 X
4 – 0.0948 X
3 + 1.2166 X
2 – 5.9604 X + 12.362 
4) Trade Deficit (USD Billion) 
     Y = 0.0063 X
4 – 0.1809 X
3 +1.8131 X
2 – 6.5946 X + 9.9523 
5) Exports/ GDP 
     Y = 0.0044 X + 0.0614 
6) Imports/GDP 
     Y = 0.0077 X + 0.0574 
7) CAD/GDP 
     Y = -0.002 X + 0.0153 
8) Trade Deficit/GDP 
     Y= 0.0004 X
2 – 0.0047 X + 0.0225 
9) Reserves/Number of Import Months 
     Y = -0.0147 X
2 + 0.9105 X + 3.4716 
10) Reserves/Debt-Service 
     Y = 0.3209 X – 0.3401 
11) Reserves/(Cumulative FPI + STED) 
     Y = 0.0227 X
2 – 0.4860 X + 4.1371 
12) Reserves/(CAD+STED) 
     Y = -0.0036 X
2 + 0.3328 X + 1.108 
13) Reserves/Base Money (M0) 
     Y = 0.0068 X + 0.0004 
14) Reserves/Broad Money (M2) 
     Y = 0.0011 X + 0.0052 
15) Reserves/(Base Money + Broad Money) 
     Y = 0.0011 X + 0.0031 
16) Gross NPA % (Public Sector Banks) 
     Y = 5E-05 X
4 + 0.007 X
3 – 0.1503 X
2 – 0.5875 X +18.324 
17) Fiscal Deficit/GDP 
     Y = 0.0005 X
4 – 0.0247 X
3 + 0.3665 X
2 – 2.0819 X + 9.952 
18) Cash Reserve Ratio 
     Y = 0.0404 X
2 – 1.4241 X + 18.457 
19) Debt Servicing Ratio 
     Y = 4E-06 X
4 – 0.0001 X
3 – 0.0002 X
2 + 0.0197 X + 0.1928 
20) Last 3-Year Average Annual Inflation % 
     Y = 0.065 X
2 – 1.5404 X +13.616 
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